New partnership to has moved to the centre of the policy debate. Local communities, meanwhile, are adapting in ways that rarely make headlines. Municipal authorities, civil-society groups and private firms have developed informal networks that in some cases respond faster than national institutions.

Officials familiar with the discussions describe a process that has moved faster than many observers expected, driven less by diplomatic breakthroughs than by mounting domestic pressure in several key capitals. The result is a fragile consensus that could unravel if economic conditions deteriorate further.

Competing interpretations

The private sector has emerged as an unexpectedly important actor. Companies with global footprints increasingly find themselves making decisions with geopolitical consequences, often without clear guidance from governments.

Ultimately, the question is not whether the system will be tested again, but how prepared it will be when that happens. On current evidence, the answer is: better than before, but not yet good enough.

The data is unambiguous. What remains contested is the political will to act on it.

Interviews with security officials suggest a growing recognition that deterrence must be paired with resilience. Hardening critical infrastructure, rehearsing crisis responses and communicating clearly with the public are no longer optional extras. This is where questions of new partnership to become most acute.

What the data shows

For policymakers, the challenge is one of sequencing. Measures that make sense in the long run — diversifying supply chains, investing in resilience, building institutional capacity — often impose short-term costs that are politically difficult to justify.

  • Short term: contain immediate risks and protect the most exposed groups.
  • Medium term: strengthen coordination and information-sharing between agencies.
  • Long term: invest in resilience, diversification and institutional capacity.

The economic stakes are considerable. Conservative estimates suggest that disruption on this scale could shave between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points off regional growth next year, with the heaviest burden falling on import-dependent economies and low-income households.

Not everyone shares this assessment. Some analysts contend that the risks have been overstated and that markets have already priced in most of the downside. The evidence for this more optimistic view is real, but it rests on assumptions about stability that recent events have repeatedly challenged.

The policy response

Critics argue that the current approach treats symptoms rather than causes. In interviews with more than two dozen practitioners, a recurring theme emerged: coordination between agencies remains weak, and information is still shared on a case-by-case basis rather than systematically.

None of this means that a negative outcome is inevitable. But it does suggest that the window for preventive action is narrowing, and that decisions taken in the next six to twelve months will shape the landscape for much of the coming decade.

Signals and noise

History offers some guidance, though not much comfort. Previous episodes of this kind were resolved only after a combination of sustained external pressure and a shift in domestic incentives — conditions that do not yet appear to be in place.

Looking ahead, three indicators will be worth watching closely: the trajectory of public spending commitments, the cohesion of the regional coalition, and whether external actors choose to escalate or de-escalate their involvement. For more context, see our research library.