State-linked group targets has moved to the centre of the policy debate. At the international level, the picture is mixed. While multilateral forums have produced statements of shared concern, concrete commitments — on funding, on verification, on enforcement — remain thin.
Our analysis of open-source data covering the past eighteen months points to a clear inflection point in the second quarter, when the frequency of reported incidents more than doubled. That trend has since plateaued, but at a level well above the pre-crisis baseline.
Regional implications
The economic stakes are considerable. Conservative estimates suggest that disruption on this scale could shave between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points off regional growth next year, with the heaviest burden falling on import-dependent economies and low-income households.
Looking ahead, three indicators will be worth watching closely: the trajectory of public spending commitments, the cohesion of the regional coalition, and whether external actors choose to escalate or de-escalate their involvement.
Resilience is not a product you buy once. It is a capability you build and rehearse every single day.
Not everyone shares this assessment. Some analysts contend that the risks have been overstated and that markets have already priced in most of the downside. The evidence for this more optimistic view is real, but it rests on assumptions about stability that recent events have repeatedly challenged. This is where questions of state-linked group targets become most acute.
What comes next
Officials familiar with the discussions describe a process that has moved faster than many observers expected, driven less by diplomatic breakthroughs than by mounting domestic pressure in several key capitals. The result is a fragile consensus that could unravel if economic conditions deteriorate further.
- Short term: contain immediate risks and protect the most exposed groups.
- Medium term: strengthen coordination and information-sharing between agencies.
- Long term: invest in resilience, diversification and institutional capacity.
None of this means that a negative outcome is inevitable. But it does suggest that the window for preventive action is narrowing, and that decisions taken in the next six to twelve months will shape the landscape for much of the coming decade.
Critics argue that the current approach treats symptoms rather than causes. In interviews with more than two dozen practitioners, a recurring theme emerged: coordination between agencies remains weak, and information is still shared on a case-by-case basis rather than systematically.
Signals and noise
The private sector has emerged as an unexpectedly important actor. Companies with global footprints increasingly find themselves making decisions with geopolitical consequences, often without clear guidance from governments.
Technology is both part of the problem and part of the solution. The same digital tools that enable faster coordination also create new vulnerabilities, from data leaks to targeted disinformation campaigns that exploit existing social divisions.
What the data shows
Interviews with security officials suggest a growing recognition that deterrence must be paired with resilience. Hardening critical infrastructure, rehearsing crisis responses and communicating clearly with the public are no longer optional extras.
Ultimately, the question is not whether the system will be tested again, but how prepared it will be when that happens. On current evidence, the answer is: better than before, but not yet good enough. For more context, see our research library.
Discussion (2)
Sign in or create a free account to join the discussion.
Riley Morgan
Excellent analysis — the section on sequencing is exactly the debate we are having internally.
Priya Raman 1 month ago
Thanks for the thoughtful comment — a fair point, and one we will explore in a follow-up.