The international law has moved to the centre of the policy debate. Not everyone shares this assessment. Some analysts contend that the risks have been overstated and that markets have already priced in most of the downside. The evidence for this more optimistic view is real, but it rests on assumptions about stability that recent events have repeatedly challenged.
Critics argue that the current approach treats symptoms rather than causes. In interviews with more than two dozen practitioners, a recurring theme emerged: coordination between agencies remains weak, and information is still shared on a case-by-case basis rather than systematically.
Why it matters now
Officials familiar with the discussions describe a process that has moved faster than many observers expected, driven less by diplomatic breakthroughs than by mounting domestic pressure in several key capitals. The result is a fragile consensus that could unravel if economic conditions deteriorate further.
For policymakers, the challenge is one of sequencing. Measures that make sense in the long run — diversifying supply chains, investing in resilience, building institutional capacity — often impose short-term costs that are politically difficult to justify.
Resilience is not a product you buy once. It is a capability you build and rehearse every single day.
At the international level, the picture is mixed. While multilateral forums have produced statements of shared concern, concrete commitments — on funding, on verification, on enforcement — remain thin. This is where questions of the international law become most acute.
The bigger picture
Technology is both part of the problem and part of the solution. The same digital tools that enable faster coordination also create new vulnerabilities, from data leaks to targeted disinformation campaigns that exploit existing social divisions.
- Short term: contain immediate risks and protect the most exposed groups.
- Medium term: strengthen coordination and information-sharing between agencies.
- Long term: invest in resilience, diversification and institutional capacity.
Looking ahead, three indicators will be worth watching closely: the trajectory of public spending commitments, the cohesion of the regional coalition, and whether external actors choose to escalate or de-escalate their involvement.
Ultimately, the question is not whether the system will be tested again, but how prepared it will be when that happens. On current evidence, the answer is: better than before, but not yet good enough.
The policy response
The private sector has emerged as an unexpectedly important actor. Companies with global footprints increasingly find themselves making decisions with geopolitical consequences, often without clear guidance from governments.
History offers some guidance, though not much comfort. Previous episodes of this kind were resolved only after a combination of sustained external pressure and a shift in domestic incentives — conditions that do not yet appear to be in place.
Competing interpretations
The legal framework has struggled to keep pace. Existing rules were designed for a different era and leave significant grey areas, particularly where state and non-state actors operate in the same space or where activity crosses multiple jurisdictions.
Our analysis of open-source data covering the past eighteen months points to a clear inflection point in the second quarter, when the frequency of reported incidents more than doubled. That trend has since plateaued, but at a level well above the pre-crisis baseline. For more context, see our research library.
Discussion (2)
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Helga Erdman
The point about the private sector is underrated. Companies are making foreign policy by default.
Marcus Chen 1 month ago
Thanks for the thoughtful comment — a fair point, and one we will explore in a follow-up.