The case for has moved to the centre of the policy debate. Our analysis of open-source data covering the past eighteen months points to a clear inflection point in the second quarter, when the frequency of reported incidents more than doubled. That trend has since plateaued, but at a level well above the pre-crisis baseline.

Not everyone shares this assessment. Some analysts contend that the risks have been overstated and that markets have already priced in most of the downside. The evidence for this more optimistic view is real, but it rests on assumptions about stability that recent events have repeatedly challenged.

The bigger picture

The private sector has emerged as an unexpectedly important actor. Companies with global footprints increasingly find themselves making decisions with geopolitical consequences, often without clear guidance from governments.

Ultimately, the question is not whether the system will be tested again, but how prepared it will be when that happens. On current evidence, the answer is: better than before, but not yet good enough.

Resilience is not a product you buy once. It is a capability you build and rehearse every single day.

Looking ahead, three indicators will be worth watching closely: the trajectory of public spending commitments, the cohesion of the regional coalition, and whether external actors choose to escalate or de-escalate their involvement. This is where questions of the case for become most acute.

What comes next

Interviews with security officials suggest a growing recognition that deterrence must be paired with resilience. Hardening critical infrastructure, rehearsing crisis responses and communicating clearly with the public are no longer optional extras.

  • Short term: contain immediate risks and protect the most exposed groups.
  • Medium term: strengthen coordination and information-sharing between agencies.
  • Long term: invest in resilience, diversification and institutional capacity.

The economic stakes are considerable. Conservative estimates suggest that disruption on this scale could shave between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points off regional growth next year, with the heaviest burden falling on import-dependent economies and low-income households.

For policymakers, the challenge is one of sequencing. Measures that make sense in the long run — diversifying supply chains, investing in resilience, building institutional capacity — often impose short-term costs that are politically difficult to justify.

The economic dimension

History offers some guidance, though not much comfort. Previous episodes of this kind were resolved only after a combination of sustained external pressure and a shift in domestic incentives — conditions that do not yet appear to be in place.

Critics argue that the current approach treats symptoms rather than causes. In interviews with more than two dozen practitioners, a recurring theme emerged: coordination between agencies remains weak, and information is still shared on a case-by-case basis rather than systematically.

Signals and noise

The legal framework has struggled to keep pace. Existing rules were designed for a different era and leave significant grey areas, particularly where state and non-state actors operate in the same space or where activity crosses multiple jurisdictions.

Local communities, meanwhile, are adapting in ways that rarely make headlines. Municipal authorities, civil-society groups and private firms have developed informal networks that in some cases respond faster than national institutions. For more context, see our research library.