New working paper has moved to the centre of the policy debate. For policymakers, the challenge is one of sequencing. Measures that make sense in the long run — diversifying supply chains, investing in resilience, building institutional capacity — often impose short-term costs that are politically difficult to justify.

Local communities, meanwhile, are adapting in ways that rarely make headlines. Municipal authorities, civil-society groups and private firms have developed informal networks that in some cases respond faster than national institutions.

What comes next

The economic stakes are considerable. Conservative estimates suggest that disruption on this scale could shave between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points off regional growth next year, with the heaviest burden falling on import-dependent economies and low-income households.

None of this means that a negative outcome is inevitable. But it does suggest that the window for preventive action is narrowing, and that decisions taken in the next six to twelve months will shape the landscape for much of the coming decade.

Every major shock of the last decade was foreseeable. Very few were prepared for.

The private sector has emerged as an unexpectedly important actor. Companies with global footprints increasingly find themselves making decisions with geopolitical consequences, often without clear guidance from governments. This is where questions of new working paper become most acute.

Risks to watch

Interviews with security officials suggest a growing recognition that deterrence must be paired with resilience. Hardening critical infrastructure, rehearsing crisis responses and communicating clearly with the public are no longer optional extras.

  • Short term: contain immediate risks and protect the most exposed groups.
  • Medium term: strengthen coordination and information-sharing between agencies.
  • Long term: invest in resilience, diversification and institutional capacity.

Not everyone shares this assessment. Some analysts contend that the risks have been overstated and that markets have already priced in most of the downside. The evidence for this more optimistic view is real, but it rests on assumptions about stability that recent events have repeatedly challenged.

Officials familiar with the discussions describe a process that has moved faster than many observers expected, driven less by diplomatic breakthroughs than by mounting domestic pressure in several key capitals. The result is a fragile consensus that could unravel if economic conditions deteriorate further.

The policy response

History offers some guidance, though not much comfort. Previous episodes of this kind were resolved only after a combination of sustained external pressure and a shift in domestic incentives — conditions that do not yet appear to be in place.

Our analysis of open-source data covering the past eighteen months points to a clear inflection point in the second quarter, when the frequency of reported incidents more than doubled. That trend has since plateaued, but at a level well above the pre-crisis baseline.

The economic dimension

Critics argue that the current approach treats symptoms rather than causes. In interviews with more than two dozen practitioners, a recurring theme emerged: coordination between agencies remains weak, and information is still shared on a case-by-case basis rather than systematically.

At the international level, the picture is mixed. While multilateral forums have produced statements of shared concern, concrete commitments — on funding, on verification, on enforcement — remain thin. For more context, see our research library.